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The term “Muslim diaspora” is often used, in popular parlance, to 
refer to those Muslim populations that live in the West but are not 
native to it, and typically originate instead from the Middle East, 
North Africa, or Asia. Yet it is not a term commonly used by 
scholars of contemporary Islam in Europe, for instance, except when 
specific dimensions of the typical diaspora experience emerge, such 
as ethnonationalist sentiments and active political or economic 
mobilization related to the country of origin. 
 
Key notions in common definitions of diaspora are the dispersal of a 
particular ethnonational group and the community’s retention of a 
transnational connection with its place of origin. The first references 
to a diaspora are in the Old Testament, recounting the life of Jewish 
communities in exile. The idea was later adopted metaphorically to 
de- scribe the role of Christians in the world. But probably no one 
would nowadays see the Christians living in United States (and here 
I am not speaking of the latest waves of refugees from the Middle 
East) as a diaspora community. So why juxtapose the words Islam 
and diaspora when talking about the Muslim citizens and inhabitants 
of Europe who could easily be native or settled inhabitants of this 
region, or might have at most tenuous connections with Muslim 
lands and ethnic groups? 
The transnational and deterritorialized dimensions of religion are 
indeed central to the global articulations of Islam in the twenty-first 
century, as scholars such as Peter Mandaville and Olivier Roy 
remind us. But these factors alone are not sufficient evidence that 
Muslims constitute a diaspora. Rather, it is the abiding territorial 
connection with the origins of a community that defines whether we 
are dealing with a diaspora or not. This means that it is possible to 
meet, just in the United Kingdom, members of the Pakistani diaspora 
who are Muslim, or an Italian diaspora that is Catholic, or a 
Moroccan diaspora that is Muslim. But one could also come across 
the Pakistani Christian diaspora or the Italian evangelical diaspora, 
or Jewish members of the Moroccan diaspora. 
In the past few years we have seen large numbers of people from 
Muslim-majority countries such as Iraq and Syria fleeing their 
homelands as a consequence of war and the political and selective 
imposition of Islamic religious norms. But it makes little sense to 
call them “Muslim diasporas” when, in fact, Christian and Yazidi 
minorities—as well as people with no particular faith—are among 
those who are emigrating and seeking refuge. The sweeping term 
Muslim diasporas also does not do justice to the pluralism and 
disagreements that exist within Islam. The widely known Sunni-Shia 
di- vide represents only the surface of these dynamics. 
Islam is practiced, understood, and lived in a wide variety of ways, 
not only in different countries, by different groups and individuals—
per- haps within the same sociocultural or ethnic environment, or 
even within the same family. Each subgroup has distinct leanings 
and preferences— spiritual, intellectual, and political—and its own 
theological points of reference. 
More specifically, “Muslim diaspora” seems an inappropriate way to 
describe those Muslims who were born, and reside, outside countries 
where Is- lam is a majority religion. The traditional concept of 
diaspora, which refers to the experience of exile and migration—
forced or self-imposed—does not encompass the circumstances of 
all Muslims who have settled in Europe or in North America or else- 
where. While many are likely to be descendants of immigrants, they 
themselves may not have lived in or perhaps even visited the 
countries their parents or grandparents came from. 
Or consider the offspring of mixed couples, where one parent is an 
indigenous European and the other is an immigrant: should they be 
categorized as autochthonous or as members of a diaspora? And 
what would either definition entail in terms of legal rights or in 
mechanisms of social inclusion or exclusion? 
What about the increasing numbers of Westerners who have 
converted to Islam? Would the blanket notion of diaspora all of a 
sudden apply to them, simply because they professed the faith? If so, 
would their emotional ties, political and ethnic identities, and sense 
of belonging immediately be subsumed by a presumedly preemptive 
diasporic dimension? And what would be the implications of all 
these dynamics for our under- standing of citizenship and of 
religious belonging in democratic, secular countries characterized by 
various degrees of separation between religion and public life? 
In this era of globalization, transnational net- works, and rapid 
technological interconnected- ness, the diaspora experience might be 
a universal one. The main religious traditions all share references to 
journeys and emigration experiences as metaphors for the human 
condition. From that perspective, there is nothing exceptional about 
Islam. 
Dynamic Traditions 
Embracing and practicing a religion always en tails a certain degree 
of both being influenced by and adapting to the local culture. Even 
though religions make claims to authenticity through references to a 
sacrosanct notion of “tradition,” anthropologists teach us that 
traditions are not, after all, fixed and eternal but rather are constantly 
renegotiated and reinvented, in different contexts and historical 
periods, by individuals and by groups. 
Contrary to some frequent assumptions about the presumed 
dogmatism, resistance to secular- ism, and lack of flexibility of 
Islamic tradition and sharia, Islam has in fact been particularly prone 
to adaptation and diversification across history and in different parts 
of the world. This might be due to a lack of a church-like, 
overarching institutionalized structure that can compellingly hold 
together and steer communities toward particular ideas, conventions, 
norms, and practices. While the pillars of Islam remain fixed, the 
forces that promulgate norms and practices are polycentric. Yet this 
fragmentation and lack of hierarchy have led to a competition for 
religious authority, which in some circles has ended up legitimating 
violent articulations of Islam. 
Transnational forces are a key feature of our times, prompting 
international relations scholars to question the authority of the state 
and its relevance as a unit of political analysis. Transnational 
corporations and social movements are now considered key actors. 
Faith-based transnational mobilization—which is a feature inherent 
in all religions that have a universal reach—has emerged as another 
important force. From this perspective as well, Islam does not appear 
to be particularly special, or to follow a logic or practice outreach 
that is much different from that of other faiths, especially the 
mainstream monotheistic traditions. Yet we often receive the 
impression that “Muslim diasporas” (a synonym for “transnational” 
networks) are mobilizing more vocally and vigorously than other 
communities. 
The current migration and refugee crisis may be reinforcing 
unwarranted assumptions about Muslims. Large numbers of people 
are fleeing from countries where Islam is a majority religion, but 
public opinion often seems to conflate their ethnic origin, religious 
affiliation, and national identities into a single, all-encompassing 
identity based solely on the predominant religion of the religion they 
are coming from. Thus, all Syrians or all Palestinians are perceived 
in Europe, Australia, and the United States as part of a “Muslim 
diaspora,” not Syrian or Palestinian or Lebanese diasporas, which 
incidentally are national communities that include a considerable 
number of Christians. 
LOOSE FAMILY 
The existence and spread of controversial net- works such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Salafis, and the Jaamat-i-Islami, which occupy 
different places on the wide spectrum of Islamist thought, are also 
often mistakenly depicted as diasporic phenomena. In fact, though 
they may have specific ethnic cores and audiences, they operate 
glob- ally thanks to the collaboration of members and supporters, 
including converts, who have varied leanings and origins. Groupings 
that are connected with the large but loose family of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, for example, may share some ideological points of 
reference and recognize key figures such as Hassan al-Banna or 
Sayyid Qutb, the movement’s founders. But they differentiate their 
goals, strategies, language, and modus operandi depending on a 
series of variables such as the characteristics of the political 
opposition they face and the social and ethnocultural contexts in 
which they are embedded. 
As a result, it is almost impossible to detect a homogeneous and 
coherent diasporic mobilization among members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. What we see instead is different ethnic groups (only 
some of which constitute a diaspora) mobilizing under the broad 
inspiration of the Brother- hood’s political ideals, with their efforts 
in some cases focused exclusively on their home countries. For 
example, some Brotherhood figures operated in and from Britain but 
with particular attention to the evolving political situation in Iraq or 
Egypt. But others in the movement—for example, the Union des 
Organisations Islamiques de France—have at other times focused on 
the condition of Muslim communities in Europe. 
Take another broad transnational Islamist movement, Salafism, 
which is often associated with Saudi Arabia. While Salafis certainly 
exist in Saudi Arabia, Saudi nationals are not actually conspicuous 
among the members of Salafi networks that are expanding across 
Europe. These networks did not arise from any particular diaspora 
com- munity. Instead, they attract youth from widely varying ethnic 
backgrounds, both with and with- out immigrant origins. The 
practices that they disseminate in the name of Islamic orthodoxy are 
not associated with the “true” historic or cultural traditions of their 
followers but are the product of a sort of copy-and-paste Islam, to 
borrow the words of a Dutch colleague, Martijn de Koning. 
Experts on the dynamics of conversion also tell us that Western 
converts often are among the most fervent enthusiasts of 
ultraorthodox practices, which purportedly emulate the style of 
dress, gender relations, and modes of communication that existed on 
the Arabian peninsula at the time of Muhammad. It is therefore 
impossible, or rather irrelevant, to seek to explain the spread of the 
niqab (female face veil) or of the burkini (full swim dress that leaves 
the face visible) by investigating the ancient practices of the Muslim 
com- munities where these fashions are taking root. One will quickly 
discover that the niqab, for instance, was not a mainstream feature of 
the Islamic faith among the Muslim communities that emigrated 
from Pakistan, Morocco, or Turkey into Europe forty or fifty years 
ago. 
Finally, no single diaspora group or diaspora logic seems to be 
behind the sad reality that young Muslims, both those living in the 
secular West and those who have remained in Muslim- majority 
countries, are joining the extremist Islamic State (ISIS). Normally, 
diasporic political mobilization is understood as the activity of a 
people in exile seeking to effect change in their country of origin 
from afar, either by lobbying for changes in the foreign policy of the 
country in which they live, or by directly participating in or seeking 
to influence the political process in their homeland. When it comes 
to ISIS, though, none of its affiliates who have carried out terrorist at- 
tacks in Europe in the past few years was a member of the Syrian or 
Iraqi diaspora. In fact, most of the attackers have been European 
citizens, born and raised in European countries. 
They may have belonged to ethnic minority groups, but do not seem 
to have participated in the kind of community activism associated 
with diasporas. While some of the groups of attackers did have 
common ethnic or national identities, that does not appear to explain 
their actions. Rather, the key common denominators among the 
attackers were a reliance on close networks of friends and family—
some were brothers—and in particular, a previous history of petty 
crime and gang culture. Misperceptions and dynamics of social 
inclusion, rather than religious doctrine or diasporic mobilization, 
appear to be central to the attractive- ness of ISIS. 
It would be misguided to identify European Islam as a monolith of 
like-minded people standing apart from the rest of secular Europe 
and its Judaic-Christian roots. Muslims in contemporary Europe 
absorb the political cultures and mentalities of the countries where 
they live. Even though there is some level of transnational 
communication along ethnic or ideological lines, the day-to-day life 
and thinking of Muslims in Europe are very much defined by the 
local and national context in which they have settled and are raising 
their families, and by the debates that are central to that culture and 
to their personal experiences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
